On Actor-Network Theory
[I]t can more technically be described as a “material-semiotic” method. This means that it maps relations that are simultaneously material (between things) and semiotic (between concepts). It assumes that many relations are both material and semiotic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actor%E2%80%93network_theory
On Persons
What we have to acknowledge, in order to begin to free ourselves from these difficulties, is the primitiveness of the concept of a person. What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. What I mean by saying that this concept is primitive can be put in a number of ways. One way is to return to those two questions I asked earlier: viz. (1) why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? and (2) why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation etc.?
P. F. Strawson on person as primitive from Individuals
On Intent
A person endowed with intention is an actant able to recognise a pattern (state) and focalize (align as to force). A person is as well an actant able to intervene in a pattern or a focalization of a pattern and either change (preserve) the pattern, itself, or both pattern and self.
http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~lachance/dolezel.htm
And so for day 2560
16.12.2013