Kant. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Lewis White Beck. P. 55, n. 17.
Teleology considers nature as a realm of ends; morals regards a possible realm of ends as realm of nature. In the former the realm of ends is a theoretical idea for the explanation of what actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea for bringing about that which is not actually real but which can become real through our conduct and which is in accordance with this idea.
Somehow this mapping of a realm of ends from the actual to the possible may be a way of broaching the appearance of the “force” entity in the possible world semantics of fiction as explained by Doležel (See Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds). Needs some thought but there is something here to consider about a relation between actual and fictional: the real.
Doležel places discussion of these felicity conditions and performatives under the heading “World Construction as Performative Force”. World construction is inflected towards questions of authority and authentification.
It is the characterization of a process, world construction, in terms of force that attracts my attention. I am intrigued by this aspect of the model. And I recall earlier in the monograph, a certain tension between the chronological and the logical is played out in the presentation of force as entity and its appearance in the catalogue of entities in the construction of a world. In a “starter terms” section, Doležel introduces first a world of states “where nothing changes, nothing happens”. Then appears the nature force as a new entity and the result is that “[w]e have now constructed a dynamic world, where changes orginate in one, inanimate source.” Finally, “[i]n the third stage, the world is augmented by a new category, the person”. (Doležel 32)
Would it be possible to mediate the move from “force” to “person” via Kant?
And so for day 1431